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Open Code Governance 
Danielle Keats Citron† 
The legitimacy of the administrative state has troubled 
courts and scholars for many decades.1 Reformers have pursued 
several approaches. Public participation allays concerns that 
agency policymaking excludes divergent perspectives and may 
partially substitute for direct democratic control.2 Strong over-
sight by politically accountable actors enhances the democratic 
 † Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. The comments 
of Richard Boldt, Maxwell Chibundu, Samir Chopra, Karen Czapanskiy, Martha Ertman, 
Lisa Fairfax, Susan Freiwald, Jon Garfunkel, James Grimmelmann, Paul Ohm, Frank 
Pasquale, Ari Schwartz, Rena Steinzor, David Super, Greg Young, and the participants in 
the University of Chicago Legal Forum’s “Law in a Networked World” symposium greatly 
improved this Article. Adam Coleman, Alice B. Johnson, and Susan McCarty provided 
excellent research assistance. Dean Karen Rothenberg and the University of Maryland 
School of Law generously supported this research. I thank the editors of the University of 
Chicago Legal Forum for their superb assistance. 
 1 See, for example, Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regula-
tory State, 62 U Chi L Rev 1, 8 (1995) (while detailing the different approaches taken by 
the Reagan, H.W. Bush and Clinton presidencies, finding that “[t]he key task for those 
interested in regulatory performance is to find ways of simultaneously promoting eco-
nomic and democratic goals”). 
 2 Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, Participation in American Politics: The Dy-
namics of Agenda-Building 164 (Johns Hopkins 2d ed 1983) (explaining that “mass par-
ticipation may be one of the major innovative forces in developing new issues and refining 
old issues that have remained on the formal agenda for some time”); Stuart Langton, 
Citizen Participation in America: Current Reflections on the State of the Art, in Stuart 
Langton, ed, Citizen Participation in America: Essays on the State of the Art 7 (Lexington 
1978) (explaining that “citizen participation has developed as an alternative means of 
monitoring government agencies”); Jerry L. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative 
State 169 (Yale 1985) (arguing that the dignitary model is both necessary and sufficient to 
structure a conversation about public values); Roger C. Cramton, The Why, Where, and 
How of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 Georgetown L J 
525 (1972) (arguing that broadened public participation improves the administrative 
decisionmaking process, giving decisions greater legitimacy and acceptance); Steven Kel-
man, Adversary and Cooperationist Institutions for Conflict Resolution in Public Policy-
making, 11 J Pol Analysis & Mgmt 178, 180 (1992) (arguing that public participation 
allows for cooperationist institutions to solve problems among themselves). 
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nature of agency decisions.3 Agencies’ expertise is said to pro-
duce rational policies insulated from politics.4 
  
Little attention has been paid to how information technolo-
gies might advance these efforts. To date, the main contribution 
of digital technologies is e-Rulemaking.5 Yet e-Rulemaking does 
little more than re-package the twentieth-century approach to 
policymaking,6 which itself has proven problematic.7 This barely 
touches information technology’s potential for improving the le-
gitimacy of the administrative state. 
Information systems offer that opportunity. Agencies in-
creasingly transfer crucial responsibilities to computer systems. 
Computers gather and interpret important data. For example, 
electronic machines record and calculate votes. Information sys-
tems incorporate and apply policy, making decisions about im-
portant individual rights, such as a person’s ability to receive 
public benefits.8 And computers store sensitive information, in-
 3 See Lawrence Lessig and Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 
94 Colum L Rev 1 (1994) (arguing that the President should be the primary overseer of 
agencies within particular limits). 
 4 See Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making Through 
Mutual Adjustment 137–41 (Free Press 1965) (explaining how insulating decisionmakers 
from the need to consider all possible value judgments leads to more rational decision-
making); Thomas O. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality: The Role of Regulatory Analysis 
in the Federal Bureaucracy 10 (Cambridge 1991) (explaining the essential elements of 
rational decisionmaking). 
 5 The term e-Rulemaking refers to the use of digital technologies to enhance the 
public’s understanding of, and participation in, agency notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
To that end, the federal government’s Regulations.gov website allows the public to search, 
view, and comment on certain proposed rules. E-Gov Website, E-Rulemaking, available at 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/egov/c-3-1-er.html> (last visited Apr 24, 2008) (describ-
ing public launch of Regulations.gov website, a “cross agency front-end web application 
that posts and allows comments on proposed federal agency rules”). Some scholars have 
embraced e-Rulemaking efforts as a means to democratize agency policymaking. See Beth 
S. Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 Emory L J 433, 435–36 (2004) 
(discussing e-Rulemaking as a way to reform the administrative process). 
 6 Stuart M. Benjamin, Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation and Political 
Institutions, 55 Duke L J 893, 897, 923–29 (2006) (arguing that proponents and skeptics of 
e-Rulemaking have not considered the role of the courts and Congress in the larger ad-
ministrative law context and contending that e-Rulemaking efforts will exact high costs 
with little net benefit). 
 7 See John M. Mendeloff, The Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation: How Over-
regulation Causes Underregulation at OSHA 7–16 (MIT 1988) (complaining that agencies 
skirt informal rulemaking process due to its cost by making policy in other ways); Jerry L. 
Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle 
Safety, 4 Yale J Reg 257 (1987) (explaining how the cumbersome rulemaking process has 
caused the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to abandon ambitious safety 
regulations in favor of a recall procedure). 
 8 Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 Wash U L Rev 1249, 1260–67 
(2008). 
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cluding federal employees’ personal data.9 Because these sys-
tems profoundly affect the public, the ability to monitor them is 
essential to the administrative state’s transparency, participa-
tory nature, rationality, and hence its democratic legitimacy. 
  
These systems, however, are opaque. Because these systems’ 
software is proprietary, the source code—the programmers’ in-
structions to the computer—is secret. Closed source code10 leaves 
users unable to discern how a system operates and protects it-
self. Thus, users have difficulty detecting programming errors 
that disenfranchise voters11 and undercount communities for the 
census. Programming mistakes that distort established policy 
routinely remain hidden from view. 
These systems’ opacity interferes with important adminis-
trative law values. Closed code prevents public participation in 
agency decisions incorporated in these systems. Unlike inter-
ested members of the public who have opportunities to collabo-
rate in policymaking through comments on proposed rules, 
stakeholders cannot provide feedback on agency decisions that 
they cannot see.12 At the same time, opaque systems impair the 
administrative state’s political accountability.13 The public can-
not hold elected officials responsible for broken systems without 
opportunities to learn about these systems’ problems. Closed sys-
 9 See, for example, Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of 
Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S Cal L Rev 241, 248–49 
(2007). 
 10 Wikipedia, Proprietary Software, available at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Proprietary_software> (last visited Apr 24, 2008). Throughout this Article, I will refer to 
systems whose source code is closed to the public as “closed systems.” I also will refer to 
closed source code as “closed code.” The instructions that run computers actually consti-
tute several layers of code. Aviel D. Rubin, Brave New Ballot: The Battle to Safeguard 
Democracy in the Age of Electronic Voting 3 (Morgan Road 2006). Source code provides the 
basic instructions to the computer. A program known as a compiler converts the source 
code into object code, a stream of ones and zeros comprehensible only to machines that 
runs inside the computer. 
 11 Earl Barr, Matt Bishop, and Mark Gondree, Fixing Federal E-Voting Standards, 
Commun of the Assoc for Computing Machinery 19, 21 (Mar 2007) (arguing that open-
code systems allow users to locate and repair flaws that would not be repaired under a 
closed system). 
 12 See Lawrence Lessig, Open Code and Open Societies, in Joseph Feller, et al, eds, 
Perspectives on Free and Open Source Software 349, 358 (MIT 2005) (explaining that any 
law embedded in code is effectively “secret law”). 
 13 Frank Pasquale and Oren Bracha are engaged in an important enterprise regard-
ing the opacity and lack of accountability in the operation of search engines. Oren Bracha 
and Frank A. Pasquale III, Federal Search Commission?: Access, Fairness and Account-
ability in the Law of Search, Cornell L Rev (forthcoming 2008); Frank A. Pasquale III, 
Taking on the Known Unknowns, Concurring Opinions (Aug 12, 2007), available at 
<http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/08/taking_on_the_k.html> (last vis-
ited Apr 24, 2008).  
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tems also undermine an agency’s expertise by applying distorted 
policy and by closing off opportunities for the broader technical 
community to provide valuable feedback on systems’ security and 
accuracy. 
This Article proposes opening up these black boxes to im-
prove the quality and democratic legitimacy of agencies’ decision-
making. My proposal would require vendors to release certain 
systems’ source codes for public review. High profile systems, 
such as e-voting machines, would command the attention of a 
wide array of technical experts,14 while other automated systems 
would likely be studied by affected interest groups.15 
Thus, an open code16 model could invigorate the participa-
tory model of the administrative state. In recent years, the cost 
and delay of involving the public has tempered enthusiasm for 
participatory approaches to administrative law.17 This proposal 
would secure valuable public input while reducing the cost of 
obtaining it. 
This proposal should appeal to advocates of strong central 
executive leadership. Open code will allow politically accountable 
actors, such as presidents and governors, to oversee agencies 
more directly. By contrast, closed code leaves those officials de-
pendent on junior subordinates for accounts of what agencies’ 
automated systems are doing and why. 
At the same time, the input of programmers advances ad-
ministrative law’s goal of marshalling expertise to improve gov-
ernance. Going back to Judge Landis and Justice Frankfurter, 
judges and scholars have argued that rational policy is best 
  
 14 See notes 174–83 and accompanying text discussing technical community’s interest 
in reviewing source code of e-voting systems. 
 15 See note 184 and accompanying text discussing stakeholders interested in auto-
mated systems. 
 16 This Article uses the term “open code” to refer to software whose source code is 
available for public review. In using this term, I distinguish open code software from 
“open source software” or “free software,” whose source code is similarly revealed to the 
public but also enjoys relaxed licensing terms. Lessig, Open Code and Open Societies at 
358 (cited in note 12); Jesus M. Gonzalez-Barahona and Gregorio Robles, Libre Software 
in Europe, in Chris DiBona, Danese Cooper, and Mark Stone, eds, Open Sources 2.0: The 
Continuing Evolution 161 n 1 (O’Reilly 2006); L. Jean Camp, Varieties of Software and 
their Implications for Effective Democratic Government, 135 Proceedings of the British 
Academy 183 (2006), available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
905277> (last visited Apr 24, 2008). This Article leaves aside the question of the licensing 
regime that should govern such software, such as whether the software would be free to 
use, modify, or sell. 
 17 See Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Delib-
erative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw U L Rev 173, 217–18 (1997) (explaining how in-
creased participation greatly increases the costs of ordinary agency decisions). 
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achieved through expert scrutiny of difficult problems.18 This 
model, however, depends on expert agencies having sufficient 
data to make optimal decisions.19 Open code makes new pro-
gramming and system design expertise relevant and available to 
the administrative state.20 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a typol-
ogy of closed systems used by administrative agencies. It identi-
fies two serious problems that closed systems conceal: program-
ming errors that cause inaccurate results and security vulner-
abilities that can lead to serious problems, such as identity theft 
and election fraud. 
Part II articulates the contours of an open code model. It 
then lays the normative foundations for such a regime, exploring 
how open code advances critical administrative law values of 
participation, political accountability, and expertise.21 Part II 
argues that this proposal favoring open code would render 
agency decision-making mechanisms embedded in these systems 
more transparent, participatory, and expert. 
Part III discusses three potential objections to an open code 
model. First, will switching from closed systems to an open code 
model be unduly costly? This Article argues that short-term costs 
should be balanced against the long-term gains that transpar-
ency brings. Second, will only high profile systems, such as e-
voting, generate feedback, leaving the rest of these systems un-
examined? This Article answers this question in the negative and 
explains that openness will provide important benefits even if 
these systems are not actually reviewed. Third, does an open 
code regime compromise privacy and security? The computer se-
curity literature rejects a “security through obscurity” regime 
and underscores the importance of openness to identify security 
  
 18 James M. Landis, The Administrative Process 6–46 (Yale 1938); Henry H. Perritt, 
Jr, The Electronic Agency and the Traditional Paradigms of Administrative Law, 44 
Admin L Rev 79, 88–89 (1992). 
 19 Stephen G. Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution 102–
03 (Knopf 2005). 
 20 Vladi Finotto and Angela Forte, Re-Use of Solutions and Open Source Software in 
Public Administrations, in Eleonora Di Maria and Stefano Micelli, eds, On Line Citizen-
ship: Emerging Technologies for European Cities 140 (Springer 2005) (“By liaising with 
open source software developer communities, local public administrations can adopt a 
specific application and contribute to its evolution while enjoying the benefits of full ac-
cess to a global pool of experts and developers ready to fix problems and suggest solu-
tions.”). 
 21 Naturally, each of these models of administrative law has been subject to criticism. 
This Article does not address those debates but instead endeavors to show how the vary-
ing models of administrative law would support this proposal. 
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vulnerabilities. This Article concludes by offering some refine-
ments to the proposal described in Part II. 
I. CLOSED CODE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
Information systems used by agencies bring important bene-
fits to the administrative state. For instance, automated systems 
cut costs, allowing agencies to manage data efficiently,22 and 
they apply policy in a uniform manner. This Part provides a ty-
pology of systems whose source code is closed and then explores 
the problems they raise. 
A. Typology of Closed Systems 
Agencies employ closed systems in one of three types.23 The 
first type collects and processes information.24 A prominent type 
of data processing system is electronic voting machines. After the 
passage of the Help America Vote Act in 2002,25 municipalities, 
counties, and states rushed to buy electronic voting systems26 
that record and tally votes.27 Private vendors build e-voting sys-
tems, incorporating both commercial off-the-shelf software and 
their own software.28 Election Systems & Software (“ES&S”), 
  
 22 William D. Eggers, Government 2.0: Using Technology to Improve Education, Cut 
Red Tape, Reduce Gridlock, and Enhance Democracy 29 (Rowman and Littlefield 2005). 
 23 This Article does not endeavor to present an exhaustive taxonomy of information 
systems used by agencies. Instead, it categorizes information systems that have a pro-
found effect on public policy and important individual rights and whose opacity impacts 
important administrative law values. 
 24 This Article refers to such systems as “data processing systems.” 
 25 The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (“HAVA”) established a program to “provide 
funds to States to replace punch card voting systems” with e-voting systems. Pub L No 
107-252, 116 Stat 1666 (2002), codified at 42 USC §§ 15301–15545 (Supp 2004). HAVA 
authorized the annual release of over a billion dollars to fund state upgrades of voting 
equipment for fiscal years 2003–2005. 42 USC § 15407 (Supp 2004).  
 26 This Article uses the terms “e-voting systems” and “e-voting machines” to refer to 
computerized systems that record in electronic form voters’ selections. E-voting systems, 
of course, come in varying types, such as Direct Recording Electronic systems (“DREs”) 
without paper trails, DREs with Voter-Verifiable Paper Trails, and Precinct Count Opti-
cal Scans. See Brennan Center for Justice, The Machinery of Democracy: Voting System 
Security, Accessibility, Usability, and Cost 2–4 (Brennan Center 2006), available at 
<http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_38150.pdf> (last visited 
Apr 24, 2008).  
 27 Rubin, Brave New Ballot at 13 (cited in note 10). 
 28 Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Elections of the House Committee on House 
Administration, 110th Cong, 1st Sess 2 (Mar 15, 2007) (testimony of Professor David 
Wagner), available at <http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/testimony-house07.pdf> 
(last visited Mar 6, 2008) (hereinafter Wagner Testimony) (stating that “a voting system 
vendor like Diebold might license software from Microsoft for use in their touchscreen 
voting machine”). Those vendors typically do not have permission to provide the source 
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Diebold, Sequoia, and Avante manufacture most of this country’s 
e-voting systems.29 
E-voting systems use proprietary software.30 As a result, 
election officials, candidates, technical experts, and interested 
citizens typically cannot inspect the source code to ensure the 
software works correctly.31 Courts provide trade secret protection 
to the source code, refusing access to it even in cases where pro-
gramming errors allegedly caused election irregularities.32 
Another data processing system is the Census Bureau’s Cur-
rent Population Survey (“CPS”). CPS uses Windows-based soft-
ware that processes interviews and aggregates census data to 
determine the amount of federal aid distributed to state and local 
governments, including housing assistance, public benefits, and 
  
code to others. 
 29 See The Machinery of Democracy at 2–4 (cited in note 26) (cataloging manufactur-
ers of various systems). More than 150,000 voting machines in use around the country 
are Diebold systems. Kim Zetter, Diebold to Change Its Name, Wired (Aug 16, 2007), 
available at <http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/08/diebold-to-chan.html> (last visited 
Feb 24, 2008).  
 30 Bev Harris, Black Box Voting 26 (Plan Nine 2004); Rubin, Brave New Ballot at 13 
(cited in note 10). 
 31 Wagner Testimony at 2 (cited in note 28). Because each state has its own election 
laws, voting equipment must meet state requirements and federal voting system guide-
lines, which have been adopted by most states. Lisa Vaas, U.S. e-Voting Lags, e-Week, 26 
(Aug 13, 2007). Federal voting standards ask vendors to share their source code with a 
testing laboratory selected by the vendor. Id. Such voting systems testing laboratories 
must be accredited by the Election Assistance Commission. Id. Only fifteen states require 
manufacturers, in some manner, to place source code in escrow for examination. Verified 
Voting Foundation, Escrow of Voting Software (April 17, 2007), available at <http:// 
www.verifiedvoting.org/downloads/EscrowProvisions.pdf> (last visited Apr 24, 2008). 
 32 See Christine Jennings v Elections Canvassing Commissionn of Florida, 958 S2d 
1083 (Fla App 2007) (denying petition for certiorari to review district court’s refusal to 
compel discovery of e-voting machines’ source code); Ryan Paul, Court: Protecting Trade 
Secrets Takes Priority over Election Transparency, Ars Technica (June 25, 2007), available 
at <http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070625-florida-appeals-court-says-trade-
secret-protection-takes-priority-over-election-transparency.html> (last visited Feb 24, 
2008). 
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unemployment.33 Census 2000 affected the allocation of over two 
trillion dollars.34 
The second type of automated system executes policy and 
renders decisions about individuals.35 Programmers building 
these systems translate policy into code.36 For example, auto-
mated public benefits systems suggest eligibility determinations 
and benefit calculations to case workers.37 Similarly, the Internal 
Revenue Service uses a decision-making system that identifies 
individuals who should be subject to tax audits.38 
The third type of closed system stores and disseminates sen-
sitive information.39 For instance, data storage systems collect 
contract data for the Department of Homeland Security.40 State 
election boards maintain databases of eligible voters.41 State and 
federal agencies store the sensitive personal information of em-
  
 33 Email from Fran Horvath, Office of Employment & Unemployment Statistics, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, to Alice B. Johnson, Research Fellow, University of Maryland 
School of Law (Sept 20, 2007) (on file with the University of Chicago Legal Forum) 
(“Horvath Email”). The Current Population Survey (“CPS”) is collected by the Census 
Bureau on behalf of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Id. Once interviews are collected, 
closed code software known as Blaise processes the information. Id. The Bureau uses 
these products to aggregate micro data, which is seasonally adjusted. Id. Seasonal ad-
justments are made by a software program that is open code and available to the public 
for downloading. Id; US Census Bureau, The X-12-ARIMA Seasonal Adjustment Program, 
available at <http://www.census.gov/srd/www/x12a/> (last visited Feb 24, 2008); Kenneth 
Prewitt, The US Decennial Census: Political Questions, Scientific Answers, 26 Population 
& Dev Rev 1, 5–6 (2000).  
 34 Prewitt, 26 Population and Dev Rev at 6 (cited in note 33). Given these stakes, it is 
“no surprise that there is a partisan edge to the focus on census numbers.” US Govern-
ment Accountability Office, Rep No GAO-06-567, Federal Assistance: Illustrative Simula-
tions of Using Statistical Population Estimates for Reallocating Certain Federal Funding 
3–4 (2006) (explaining that Census data determines federal grant programs such as 
Medicaid, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, National School Lunch Program, 
Head Start, transit grants, child support enforcement, state administrative matching for 
food stamp program, public housing funds, and unemployment insurance). 
 35 This Article refers to the second type of automated system as “decision-making 
systems.” 
 36 See Citron, 85 Wash U L Rev at 1260–61, 1281–88 (cited in note 8) (addressing the 
due process problems raised by decisionmaking systems).  
 37 California, Colorado, Texas, and Florida employ such systems. See Terry Sapp, 
Making Things Happen, 64 Policy & Practice 40 (June 1, 2006) (discussing the use of 
public benefits system in California); Cynthia V. Fukami and Donald J. McCubbrey, 
Colorado Benefits Management System (B): The Emperor’s New System, 18 Commun of 
the Assoc for Info Sys 488 (2006) (discussing the new benefits management system in 
Colorado).  
 38 Camp, 135 Proceedings of the British Academy 183 (cited in note 16). 
 39 This Article refers to the third type as “data storage systems.” 
 40 Ellen Nakashima and Brian Krebs, Contractor Faulted in DHS Data Breach, Wash 
Post A1 (Sept 24, 2007). 
 41 Jennifer Granick, Let Post-Election Debugging Begin, Wired (Nov 8, 2006), avail-
able at <http://www.wired.com/politics/law/commentary/circuitcourt/2006/11/72083> (last 
visited Feb 24, 2008). 
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ployees and citizens.42 The Environmental Protection Agency’s 
data registry collects information about firms’ environmentally-
related activities that is then released in an annual report.43 
B. Problems of Closed Systems 
1. Inaccuracy. 
Programming errors in closed systems frequently cause in-
accurate findings.44 Such errors are particularly common in data 
processing and decision-making systems. As this section ex-
plains, software errors can disenfranchise voters, undercount 
communities for the census, and distort policies in automated 
public benefits systems. 
In hundreds of instances, e-voting machines have lost or 
added votes.45 In November 2006, e-voting systems in Florida 
failed to record eighteen thousand ballots in a hotly contested 
congressional race.46 During the 2006 primaries, e-voting ma-
chines in Cuyahoga County, Ohio made serious errors: “in 72.5 
  
 42 See Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Informa-
tion Age 182 (NYU 2004); Citron, 80 S Cal L Rev at 295 (cited in note 9).  
 43 Daniel J. Fiorino, Rethinking Environmental Regulation: Perspectives on Law and 
Governance, 23 Harv Envir L Rev 441, 448 (1999) (discussing federal Toxics Release In-
ventory). The EPA’s data registry runs on Oracle’s proprietary software. Telephone Inter-
view by Alice B. Johnson with Nathan Wilkes, Environmental Protection Agency, Envi-
ronmental Data Registry (Sept 28, 2007). 
 44 To be sure, the programming errors and security problems discussed in this section 
occur in both open and closed systems. But these problems are particularly troubling in 
closed systems as they cannot be easily identified and fixed. 
 45 Clive Thompson, Can You Count on Voting Machines?, NY Times Magazine 40 
(Jan 6, 2008), available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/06/magazine/06Vote-t.html> 
(last visited Feb 24, 2008). See also Harris, Black Box Voting at 4–16 (cited in note 30); 
Rubin, Brave New Ballot at 61 (cited in note 10) (finding “gross design and programming 
errors” in Diebold machines); US Government Accountability Office, Rep No GAO 05-956, 
Elections: Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems 
Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed 2 (2005); Barr, Bishop, and Gon-
dree, Fixing Federal E-Voting Standards at 19 (cited in note 11); Donald P. Moynihan, 
Building Secure Elections: E-Voting, Security, and Systems Theory, 64 Pub Admin Rev 
515, 519 (2004). 
 46 Kim Zetter, Academics Call Foul on Florida Test of Voting Machines, Wired (Apr 
16, 2007), available at <http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/04/academics_call_.html> 
(last visited Feb 24, 2008). Just before the election, ES&S admitted that its poor software 
design risked losing votes. Kim Zetter, Docs Point to E-Voting Bug in Contested Race, 
Wired (Apr 17, 2007), available at <http://www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/ 
2007/04/evotinganalysis> (last visited Feb 24, 2008); Kim Zetter, E-Vote Memo is a 
“Smoking Gun,” Wired (Mar 22, 2007), available at <http://www.wired.com/politics/law/ 
news/2007/03/EVOTE_0322> (last visited Feb 24, 2008); Kim Zetter, Ohio Audit Says 
Diebold Vote Database May Have Been Corrupted, Wired (Apr 19, 2007), available at 
<http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/04/diebold_vote_da.html> (last visited Feb 24, 
2008). 
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percent of the audited machines, the paper trail did not match 
the digital tally on the memory cards.”47 
In 2004, e-voting machines in an Ohio precinct recorded 
3,893 votes for President Bush even though only 800 individuals 
were registered to vote there.48 In Indiana, e-voting machines 
counted 144,000 votes in a county that only had 5,352 registered 
voters.49 In 2002, Florida’s e-voting machines lost as much as 
21.5 percent of the votes in certain counties.50 In 2000, e-voting 
machines in Iowa recorded four million votes when roughly three 
hundred ballots were inputted.51 
Local officials caught these errors due to the obvious dispari-
ties between the number of votes cast and the number of regis-
tered voters.52 In some cases, official inquiry into these errors led 
to the discovery of other problems, including a vendor’s failure to 
certify53 its e-voting machines.54 But less obvious errors, such as 
switching votes from one candidate to another, are much more 
likely to go unnoticed.55 A July 2007 investigative report re-  
 47 Thompson, Voting Machines, NY Times Magazine (cited in note 45). 
 48 John Schwartz, Glitch Found in Ohio Counting, NY Times A12 (Nov 6, 2004). In 
Franklin County, Ohio, an e-voting system reported that Bush received 4,258 votes 
against 260 for Kerry in a precinct where only 638 voters had cast ballots. Rubin, Brave 
New Ballot at 259 (cited in note 10). 
 49 Cynthia L. Webb, Cashing in on E-Voting?, Technews.com (Financial Times Nov 
13, 2003). 
 50 Vaas, US e-Voting Lags, e-Week at 26 (cited in note 31). ES&S e-voting machines 
failed to count 103,222 votes in Broward County, Florida. More Ballots Found in Florida; 
Outcome Same, Omaha World-Herald 6a (Nov 9, 2002). 
 51 Jim Carlton, Fuzzy Numbers: Election Snafus Went Far Beyond Florida in Year 
When it Mattered, Wall St J A1 (Nov 17, 2000). 
 52 Moynihan, 64 Pub Admin Rev at 519 (cited in note 45). 
 53 Certification provides independent verification that voting systems comply with 
the “functional capabilities, accessibility, and security requirements necessary to ensure 
the integrity and reliability of voting systems.” Wikipedia, Certification of Voting Ma-
chines, available at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiw/Certification_of_voting_machines> (last 
visited Feb 24, 2008). Under HAVA, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (“EAC”) 
bears responsibility for accrediting voting system test laboratories and certifying voting 
equipment through the Voting System Certification & Laboratory Accreditation Program. 
Id. Although federal certification for voting machines is voluntary, most states require 
such certification for their voting systems. See also note 31 discussing the EAC’s role in 
accrediting e-voting systems.  
 54 Kim Zetter, ES&S to be Rebuked, Fined and Possibly Banned in CA?, Wired, (Aug 
21, 2007), available at <http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/08/ess-to-be-rebuk.html> 
(last visited Feb 24, 2008) (reporting California’s accusation that ES&S sold it machines 
that had not been tested or certified for use). The report also noted that ES&S assembled 
its machines in a sweatshop in the Philippines. Id. Due to problems with ES&S e-voting 
machines, Sarasota County in Florida committed to switching to Diebold machines in 
July 2007. Kim Zetter, Florida County at Center of Election Storm Dumps ES&S in Favor 
of Diebold, Wired (June 7, 2007), available at <http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/06/ 
florida_county_.html> (last visited Feb 24, 2008). 
 55 Adam Cohen, What’s Wrong with My Voting Machine? NY Times A24 (Dec 4, 2006) 
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vealed that 30 to 40 percent of ES&S’s e-voting machines under 
review changed voters’ selections.56 Colorado’s Secretary of State 
decertified e-voting systems manufactured by ES&S because 
tests demonstrated that the machines could not accurately count 
votes.57 
Software flaws in e-voting machines raise concerns about the 
accuracy of other data processing systems. For instance, pro-
gramming errors in CPS could result in inequitable funding for 
communities.58 Software flaws that cause miscounts would deny 
local jurisdictions funds from federal programs.59 If CPS under-
counts the population in a jurisdiction with concentrations of 
groups requiring federal assistance, members of those groups 
will be deprived of entitlements that the benefits systems were 
designed to provide them.60 
Decision-making systems are also riddled with programming 
flaws. When computer programmers translate policy into auto-
mated public benefits systems, they often distort it.61 This is so 
  
(noting reports of “vote flipping” in Broward County, Florida in November 2006 election); 
Todd R. Weiss, ‘Vote Flipping’ Is Real, but Its Cause Is the Subject of Debate, Computer-
world.com (Nov 13, 2006), available at <http://www.computerworld.com/action/article. 
do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=273455> (last visited Feb 24, 2008).  
 56 Kim Zetter, ES&S Discloses Full List of Manufacturers, Wired (Aug 27, 2007), 
available at <http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/08/ess-discloses-f.html> (last visited 
Feb 24, 2008). Further complicating matters is the fact that voter-verified paper trails are 
not required in twenty-three states. Ian Urbina and Christopher Drew, Big Shift Seen in 
Voting Methods with Turn Back to a Paper Trail, NY Times A1 (Dec 8, 2006) (explaining 
that e-voting machines used in Georgia and Maryland do not produce voter-verified paper 
trails). Without such paper trails, voters have no means to check if e-voting machines 
actually recorded their votes. Adam Cohen, The Good News (Really) About Voting Ma-
chines, NY Times (Jan 10, 2007); Steven Levy, Black Box Voting Blues, Newsweek 69 
(Nov 3, 2003). But even when e-voting machines produce paper trails, nothing guarantees 
that the machines actually recorded the vote as cast or at all. 
 57 E-Vote: Colorado Tests Voting Equipment, Decertifies Some, Government Technol-
ogy (eRepublic Dec 18, 2007), available at <http://www.govtech.com/gt/articles/237095? 
utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=GTEN%20-%20E-
Newsletter_2007_12_19> (last visited Feb 24, 2008). 
 58 Prewitt, 26 Population & Dev Rev at 7 (cited in note 33). 
 59 Id at 8. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Pamela Martineau, With Lessons Learned, Yolo Launches CalWIN Program, Sac-
ramento Bee B1 (May 3, 2005) (noting pay discrepancies to welfare and general assistance 
recipients due to programming errors); Evelyn Larrubia and Caitlin Liu, County’s Com-
puter System is Botching Medical Benefits Aid, LA Times H1 (Feb 17, 2002) (explaining 
that computer errors resulted in denial of prenatal care); Tamara Clark v Department of 
Children & Family Services, No 05-2105RP, Petition to Determine Invalidity of Proposed 
Rule 65A-1.400 and ESS Online Benefits Application Form 6 (Fla Div Admin Hearings 
June 10, 2005) (arguing that relative caregivers could not apply for Temporary Assistance 
to Needy Families due to the design of the online application in violation of Florida law). 
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for several reasons. Although all translations shade meaning,62 a 
translation of policy from human language into code poses a 
more significant risk of radically altering that policy than would 
a translation from English to another human language.63 This is 
in part because artificial languages intelligible to computers 
have a limited range of key words as compared to human lan-
guages.64 Computer languages thus may be unable to capture a 
policy’s nuances.65 
Code writers interpret policy when they translate it from 
human language to computer language.66 Distortions in policy 
have been attributed to the fact that programmers building code 
lack “policy knowledge.”67 This is neither surprising nor easily 
remedied. Private information technology consultants cannot be 
expected to have specialized expertise in regulatory or public 
benefits programs. And programmers working for government 
agencies tend to work on a wide variety of programs, preventing 
them from developing expertise in any given area. 
Policy changes may stem from a programmer’s values.68 Pro-
grammers can unconsciously phrase a question in a biased man-
ner.69 In a complex software system composed of smaller subsys-  
 62 See generally Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Johns Hopkins 1976) (Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak trans); see also J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal The-
ory, 96 Yale L J 743, 783–86 (1987). 
 63 Australian Administrative Review Council, Automated Assistance in Administra-
tive Decision Making 18 (2004), available at <http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/rwpattach. 
nsf/VAP/(E671321254BE241EF50E9203E76822F1)~AAADMreportPDF.PDF> (last vis-
ited Feb 24, 2008) (hereinafter Aus Admin Rev, Automated Assistance). 
 64 Id; James Grimmelmann, Note, Regulation by Software, 114 Yale L J 1719, 1728 
(2005). 
 65 Graham Greenleaf, Andrew Mowbray, and Peter van Dijk, Representing and Using 
Legal Knowledge in Integrated Decision Support Systems: DataLex WorkStations, 3 Artifi-
cial Intelligence & L 97, 127 (1995). 
 66 Aus Admin Rev, Automated Assistance at 29 (cited in note 63). 
 67 Office of Inspector General, Texas Health & Human Services Comm, TIERS/IEES 
Review 29 (2007) (copy on file with U Chi Legal F ); Deloitte, State of Colorado: CBMS 
Post-Implementation Review 9 (May 2005) (copy on file with U Chi Legal F ) (explaining 
that incorrect rules embedded in CBMS were in part due to incorrect policy interpretation 
by programmers). But see Jessica Weidling, Housing Hopes 47, Government Tech (June 
2007) (noting that in “uncharacteristic move for the public sector,” Philadelphia Housing 
Authority administrators spent time with software provider to carefully discuss require-
ments of their automated telephone system). 
 68 Code embeds the values and choices of the code writer. Lawrence Lessig, Code 
Version 2.0 102 (Basic 2006). 
 69 See Helen Nissenbaum, How Computer Systems Embody Values, Computer 119 
(Mar 2001) (explaining that systems can unfairly discriminate against specific sectors of 
users); Batya Friedman and Helen Nissenbaum, Bias in Computer Systems, 14 Assoc 
Computing Machinery Transactions on Info Systems 330, 333 (1996) (describing auto-
mated loan program whose system assigns negative value to applicants from certain 
locations, such as high-crime or low-income neighborhoods). 
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tems, the actual bias of the system “may well be a composite of 
rules specified by different programmers.”70 
Inaccuracy can spring from a code writer’s preference for bi-
nary questions that are easily translated into code.71 Policy, how-
ever, often involves the weighing of multiple variables.72 There is 
a significant risk that code writers may fail to accurately capture 
these nuances given their bias for binary choices.73 Programmers 
also may inappropriately narrow the discretion available to a 
system’s users.74 
Distorted policy might also stem from an agency’s decision to 
automate policy changes that require, but have not received, 
rulemaking procedures. Professor Evelyn Brodkin has studied 
frontline bureaucratic routines that create new policy at the 
point of delivery.75 For instance, lower-level bureaucrats often 
make policy when established policy is internally contradictory.76 
Such practices produce “street-level” welfare policies that have 
not been published and vetted through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking procedures.77 Decision-making systems could auto-
mate such policy.78 
Whether distorted policy stems from programming errors or 
deliberate agency action, the resulting inaccuracy is the same. 
Automated public benefits systems in California, Colorado, Flor-
ida, and Texas incorporated distorted policies that changed es-
  
 70 Grimmelmann, 114 Yale L J at 1737 (cited in note 64). 
 71 Denise Kersten, Bytes vs. Brains, 37 Government Exec 30 (Sept 1, 2005) (explain-
ing the difficulties that may arise from translating more complex inquiries into code). 
 72 For example, the Food Stamp Act and federal regulations limit food stamps of 
childless adults to three months with six exceptions, which cross reference other excep-
tions that, in turn, refer to still other exceptions. 7 USC § 2015(o) (2000); 7 CFR § 273.25 
(2008). Those writing code may be tempted to impose a three-month rule without the 
complicated and arguably confusing exceptions. See David A. Super, Are Rights Efficient? 
Challenging the Managerial Critique of Individual Rights, 93 Cal L Rev 1051, 1096 n 205 
(2005) (discussing potential for eligible workers and those designing notices to read three-
month rule with regard to childless adults seeking food stamps without regard to the 
exceptions). 
 73 Aus Admin Rev, Automated Assistance at 21 (cited in note 63) (stating specific 
instances in which allowing an agency officer to override an expert system would be pref-
erable). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Evelyn Z. Brodkin, Street-Level Research: Policy at the Front Lines, in Mary Clare 
Lennon and Thomas Corbett, eds, Policy into Action: Implementation Research and Wel-
fare Reform 145 (Urban Institute 2003). Brodkin’s important research aims to render this 
opaque policy more transparent. 
 76 Id at 149. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Automated street-level welfare policy would require notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing to the same extent that non-automated street-level policy would. 
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tablished rules, often in violation of federal and state law. For 
instance, code writers embedded over nine hundred incorrect 
rules into Colorado’s Benefits Management System (“CBMS”) 
from September 2004 to April 2007.79 With one such incorrect 
rule, CBMS denied Medicaid to breast and cervical cancer pa-
tients based on income and asset limits that were not authorized 
by federal or state law.80 Another distorted rule caused CBMS to 
discontinue food stamps to individuals with past drug problems 
in violation of Colorado law.81 In all, CBMS rendered hundreds 
of thousands of erroneous eligibility decisions and benefits calcu-
lations.82 
  
2. Security problems. 
Data processing systems can have serious security problems. 
In 2007, California’s Secretary of State launched an investigation 
of the state’s e-voting systems.83 Teams of computer scientists 
found “deep architectural flaws” in the source code of the state’s 
e-voting machines.84 These flaws rendered the e-voting systems 
 79 See Colorado Benefits Management System, Decision Table Release Notes Covering 
2004–2007; Deloitte, CBMS Post-Implementation Review at 10 (cited in note 67) (explain-
ing that there were 175 distinct defects in the Medicaid rules table in 2005). For other 
incorrect rules encoded in the system, see Colorado Benefits Management System, Deci-
sion Table Release Notes for February 24–25, 2007 19 (Feb 26, 2007) (issuing correction of 
code that exempted a child’s earnings in calculating food stamps where the child was the 
head of the household in contravention of federal regulations); Colorado Benefits Man-
agement System, Decision Table Release Notes for August 12–13, 2006 10 (Aug 11, 2006) 
(correcting embedded rule that did not allow Medicare premium as an expense for dis-
abled individual in contravention of federal regulations). 
 80 Colorado Benefits Management System, Decision Table Release Notes for March 
10–11, 2007 10 (Mar 7, 2007) (fixing rule that improperly imposed income limits on 
women with breast or cervical cancer in violation of 42 USC § 1396r-1b and Colo Rev Stat 
Ann § 25.5-5-308). 
 81 Colorado Benefits Management System, Decision Table Release Notes for February 
3–4, 2007 24 (Feb 1, 2007) (correcting rule embedded in system that contravened Colo Rev 
Stat § 26-2-305, which mandates that individuals “shall not be ineligible [for food stamps] 
due to a drug conviction unless misuse of food stamp benefits is part of the court find-
ings”). 
 82 David Migoya, Feds Give Colorado a Big Bill, Denver Post B1 (Apr 12, 2007) (ex-
plaining that CBMS made up to 11,000 errors per month). 
 83 Joseph A. Calandrino, et al, Source Code Review of the Diebold Voting System (July 
20, 2007), available at <http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/diebold-
source-public-jul29.pdf> (last visited Feb 24, 2008); Matt Blaze, et al, Source Code Review 
of the Sequoia Voting System (July 20, 2007), available at <http://www.sos.ca.gov/ 
elections/voting_systems/ttbr/sequoia-source-public-jul26.pdf> (last visited Feb 24, 2008). 
California could order a review of the source code because it is one of the few states that 
mandate submission of the source code into escrow for official review. 
 84 Calandrino et al, Source Code Review at 10–24 (cited in note 83). The voting ma-
chines subject to review were manufactured by Diebold Election Systems, Hart Inter-
Civic, Sequoia Voting Systems, and Elections Systems and Software, Inc. Website of 
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vulnerable to attacks and bugs.85 For instance, the source codes 
allowed the insertion of malicious code and viruses that would 
alter votes.86 
Reviewers also found the source codes to be too complex to 
resist bugs.87 One vendor incorporated Microsoft’s Windows, 
which is notorious for security problems, in its system.88 All of 
the state’s e-voting systems used vulnerable encryption schemes, 
often with critical security codes stored in files as plain text.89 
Based on these findings, California’s Secretary of State ordered 
vendors to fix the systems and has conditionally recertified them 
pending further review.90 In December 2007, Colorado’s Secre-
tary of State decertified the state’s Sequoia e-voting machines 
due to a variety of security risk factors.91 
  
California Secretary of State Debra Bowen, Top-to-Bottom Review, available at 
<http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_vsr.htm> (last visited Feb 24, 2008). In 2003, 
computer scientists detected these same flaws when Diebold’s source code was leaked 
onto the Internet. Kim Zetter, CA Releases Source Code Review of Voting Machines—New 
Security Flaws Revealed; Old Ones Were Never Fixed, Wired (Aug 3, 2007), available at 
<http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/08/ca-releases-sou.html> (last visited Jan 23, 
2008); Moynihan, 64 Pub Admin Rev at 520 (cited in note 45). See also text accompanying 
notes 125–26 (discussing the communities that uncovered and publicized the flaws in 
Diebold’s e-voting machines in 2003). 
 85 Wagner Testimony at 2 (cited in note 28) (describing the inadequacy of testing 
laboratories in finding security flaws); Calandrino, et al, Source Code Review at 10–24 
(cited in note 83); IDG News Service, Group Says e-Voting Paper Trail Wouldn’t Improve 
Security, Computerworld (Sept 18, 2007), available at <http://www.computerworld.com/ 
action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&taxonomyName=it_in_government&article 
Id=9037399&taxonomyId=69&intsrc=kc_top> (last visited Feb 24, 2008); Vaas, U.S. e-
Voting Lags, e-Week at 23 (cited in note 31). In 2006, computer scientist Professor Ed-
ward Felten analyzed an anonymously donated AccuVote-TS e-voting machine and dis-
covered that the machine did not “authenticate” software—it would run any code a 
hacker would install on an easily inserted flash-memory card. Thompson, Voting Ma-
chines, NY Times Magazine (cited in note 45). 
 86 Calandrino et al, Source Code Review at 10–24 (cited in note 83). One of the reports 
explained that creating a voting machine virus would require moderate programming 
skills and access to voting equipment, both of which are available. Id. Indeed, a Diebold 
system was recently listed on eBay. Id. 
 87 Id at 24. Diebold’s systems also used C and C++ programming languages, which 
are known to be prone to security problems. Id at 28–29. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Kim Zetter, Help Feds Build a Better Voting Machine, Wired (Sept 6, 2007), avail-
able at <http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/09/tell-uncle-sam-.html> (last visited Feb 
24, 2008). Quite alarmingly, San Diego County named a former sales representative for 
Diebold as its Registrar of voters. Kim Zetter, Former Diebold Sales Rep Becomes Regis-
trar of Voters in San Diego, Wired (May 11, 2007), available at <http://blog.wired.com/ 
27bstroke6/2007/05/former_diebold_.html> (last visited Feb 24, 2008). 
 90 Robert McMillan, California Puts Limits on Use of E-Voting Systems, Computer-
world (Aug 13, 2007), available at <http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do? 
command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=300571> (last visited Feb 24, 2008). 
 91 E-Vote: Colorado Tests Voting Equipment, Government Technology (cited in note 
57). 
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Data storage systems also lack adequate security, facilitat-
ing the release of sensitive personal information kept by agen-
cies. Consider these data leaks from 2006 and 2007. Attackers 
broke into the Department of Energy’s computer system and 
stole Social Security numbers of federal employees.92 Hackers 
breached the Nebraska Treasurer’s system, stealing Social Secu-
rity numbers and tax identification numbers from nine thousand 
businesses.93 The Chicago Voter Database was breached, com-
promising the Social Security numbers of 1.35 million resi-
dents.94 Attackers invaded the online database of Iowa’s De-
partment of Education, exposing sensitive personal data of six 
hundred individuals.95 The release of sensitive personal data 
raises the risk of identity theft and stalking.96 
Current legal mechanisms have not sufficiently addressed 
the security problems that afflict data storage systems. The E-
Government Act of 200297 (“E-Government Act”) requires federal 
administrative agencies to conduct privacy impact assessments 
(“PIAs”) when developing or purchasing systems that collect, 
store, or disseminate personally identifiable information.98 Pur-
suant to Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) guidance, 
PIAs must identify and evaluate potential threats to privacy, 
discuss alternatives, identify appropriate risk mitigation meas-
ures, and articulate the rationale for the final design choice.99 
The E-Government Act, however, has achieved mixed results 
to date.100 The incidence of agency noncompliance is significant: 
12 percent of agencies do not have written processes or policies 
  
 92 Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches, available at <http:// 
www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm> (last visited Feb 24, 2008). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. For instance, independent contractor Unisys Corporation built and managed 
the information technology networks for the Transportation Security Administration and 
the DHS headquarters. Nakashima and Krebs, Contractor Faulted, Wash Post (cited in 
note 40). The closed nature of the system prevented the agency and the public from over-
seeing the system, which was subject to three months of cyber-intrusions by hackers. It 
allowed Unisys to falsely certify that the network had been protected to cover up its lax 
oversight. Id. 
 96 Citron, 80 S Cal L Rev at 251–52 (cited in note 9). 
 97 Pub L No 107-347, 116 Stat 2899. 
 98 44 USC § 3501 note (2000 & Supp 2002). 
 99 See Office of Management and Budget, OMB Guidance for Implementing the Pri-
vacy Provisions of the E-Government Act of 2002, M-03-22 (Sept 26, 2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/m03-22.html (visited June 16, 2008). 
 100 Kenneth A. Bamberger and Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking in Ad-
ministrative Agencies, 75 U Chi L Rev 75, 76, 81–82, 83 (2008) (arguing that PIA process 
requirement is insufficient to address privacy concerns). 
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for all listed aspects of PIAs and 16 percent of systems covered 
by the PIA requirement did not have a complete or current 
PIA.101 As Kenneth Bamberger and Deirdre Mulligan have force-
fully argued, the E-Government Act may have little chance of 
future success in part due to the public’s inability to comment on 
the design of systems whose specifications and source codes re-
main obscured.102 An open code solution would tackle this prob-
lem. 
The next Part suggests opening up these systems and ex-
plores why administrative law values support this proposal. 
II. ENHANCING THE DEMOCRATIC AND EXPERT NATURE OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNANCE WITH OPEN CODE 
Closed code inhibits public participation in the development 
of critical information systems. Because the technical community 
has no opportunity to identify a system’s problems, an unin-
formed public cannot press politically accountable actors to rem-
edy them. With closed code, the expertise of a broader technical 
community is unavailable to agencies. 
An open code model has the potential to redress these prob-
lems. This Part begins by developing that model. Then, it dem-
onstrates how open code governance can advance the transpar-
ency, democratic legitimacy, and expertise of the administrative 
state. 
A. Open Code Proposal 
The source code of critical information systems should be 
open to the public.103 Open code would reveal how a system 
works, shedding light on the policies encoded in it.104 It would 
allow interested parties to discuss the assumptions that underlie 
  
 101 Id at 81. 
 102 Id at 88–89. 
 103 See, for example, Lawrence Lessig, The Limits in Open Code: Regulatory Stan-
dards and the Future of the Net, 14 Berkeley Tech L J 759, 764 (1999) (arguing that open 
code decreases the opportunity for government regulation of code). 
 104 David M. Berry and Giles Moss, Free and Open-Source Software: Opening and 
Democratising e-Government’s Black Box, 11 Info Polity 21, 23 (2006) (discussing the 
benefits of non-proprietary software). Software architect Jon Garfunkel suggests that 
open business rules could run on top of a proprietary rules engine that constitutes the 
system’s logic. Email from Jon Garfunkel, Senior Process Architect, Pegasystems, to 
Danielle Keats Citron (Dec 20, 2007) (copy on file with author and U Chi Legal F ). 
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the digital processes.105 And open code would permit inspection 
of a system’s security features.106 
  
This proposal does not insist that agencies eliminate private 
vendors and generate the code themselves, either by relying on 
volunteer programmers or on government information technol-
ogy departments. Instead, vendors constructing these systems 
would be required to release the source code to the public before 
their purchase or implementation. Just as procurement contracts 
insist that government contractors refrain from discriminatory 
practices, agencies could require that vendors make transparent 
the source code for critical systems to facilitate public feedback 
and executive oversight. Computer security expert Bruce 
Schneier explains that systems built by private vendors whose 
source codes are opened to the public offer both safety and reli-
ability.107 
An open code model could be pursued in various ways. Agen-
cies could insist on open code systems. Vendors would be re-
quired to release to the public a system’s specifications and 
source code during the bidding process and before a purchased 
system goes live.108 To that end, the OMB could issue a circular 
conditioning the provision of federal funding for technology pur-
chases on the use of open code.109 A state budget office could do 
the same for local purchases receiving state aid. 
For example, the San Francisco Elections Commission 
(“Commission”) has issued a non-binding appeal to California’s 
Department of Elections to “make reasonable efforts to select and 
 105 Camp, 135 Proceedings of the British Academy (cited in note 16). Programmers 
should provide comments that explain why they wrote the code they way that they did 
and exactly how they did it. See Posting of Rebecca Buckman, Men Write Code From 
Mars, Women Write More Helpful Code From Venus, Wall St J Blog (June 6, 2008), avail-
able at <http://blogs.wsj.com/biztech/2008/06/06/men-write-code-from-mars-women-write-
more-helpful-code-from-venus/> (last visited June 30, 2008). The code would then become 
a roadmap for others who want to understand the policies embedded in it. Id. Emma 
McGrattan, one of Silicon Valley’s highest-ranking programmers, has instituted new 
coding standards at Ingres, where she is a senior vice-president of engineering, which 
requires programmers to include a detailed set of comments before each block of code 
explaining what the piece of code does and why and a detailed history of any changes 
programmers make to the code. Id. I thank James Grimmelmann for this helpful point. 
 106 Wagner Testimony at 3 (cited in note 28). 
 107 Bruce Schneier, Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World 344 (Wiley 
2004). 
 108 But see Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of 
Information, 52 Duke L J 1245, 1275 (2003) (advocating that software written for gov-
ernment should be released as “free software” under relaxed licensing regime to enhance 
the commons approach of software development). 
 109 I thank my colleague David Super for this insight. 
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use voting systems technology, including hardware and software 
that at a minimum is publicly disclosed.”110 The Commission de-
fined “public disclosure” as the right to inspect, test, and com-
ment on technology during the procurement process.111 Thus, if 
adopted, this policy would require prospective vendors to release 
their source codes during the bidding process. 
Alternatively, legislators could mandate open code sys-
tems.112 For instance, eighteen countries require the use of open 
source software in government offices.113 In 2006, the California 
legislature held hearings on whether its electoral system should 
use open source software.114 The next sections provide normative 
support for the use of open code software, relying on different 
models of the administrative state. 
B. Participation Enhanced 
Open code systems secure meaningful opportunities for pub-
lic input, advancing the participatory model of administrative 
law. This model promotes collaboration between the public and 
agencies in setting and achieving policy goals.115 Although the 
value of public participation varies depending on the context, it 
is viewed as generating better information for agency delibera-
  
 110 San Francisco Elections Commission, Motions and Resolutions Passed by the San 
Francisco Elections Commission in 2007, available at <http://www.ci.sf.ca.us/site/ 
electionscommission_index.asp?id=55693> (last visited Feb 24, 2008). 
 111 Id. 
 112 See Jyh-An Lee, New Perspectives on Public Goods Production: Policy Implications 
of Open Source Software, 9 Vand J of Enter & Tech L 45, 61 (2006) (explaining that Ger-
many, Spain, and the Netherlands have all passed resolutions urging their governments 
to use open-source software). 
 113 Id at 60 (explaining that national legislatures of Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, France, Italy, Peru, Spain, and Ukraine require use of open-source 
software in government offices). 
 114 Wayne Hanson, California Holds Hearing on Open Source Software in Election 
Systems, Government Tech (eRepublic Feb 8, 2006), available at <http://www.govtech. 
com/gt/articles/98361> (last visited Feb 24, 2008). 
 115 This Article uses the term “participatory model” to refer to a constellation of theo-
ries of regulatory governance that envision regulation as the product of collective delib-
eration about regulatory goals and priorities. See, for example, Orly Lobel, The Renew 
Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 
89 Minn L Rev 342, 377 (2004); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating 
the Administrative Process, 98 Colum L Rev 1, 76 (1998). See also Cass R. Sunstein, After 
the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State (Harvard 1990) (viewing gov-
ernmental process as deliberation oriented to public good rather than series of interest-
group tradeoffs); Gerald E. Frug, Administrative Democracy, in David H. Rosenbloom and 
Richard D. Schwartz, eds, Handbook of Regulation and Administrative Law 519, 520 
(Marcel Dekker 1994). 
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tion.116 This model envisions participation as enhancing an 
agency’s legitimacy by cultivating the public’s sense that it is 
involved in, and bears responsibility for, government.117 In addi-
tion, participation is understood as offsetting the influence of 
well-organized interest groups through the inclusion of tradi-
tionally unrepresented interests.118 
An open code model creates new opportunities for diverse 
groups to participate in the automated administrative state.119 
Networked technologies certainly make public participation eas-
ier and cheaper.120 Digital networks facilitate peer production, a 
process by which individuals, whose actions are not coordinated 
either by managers or by market price signals, jointly produce 
information.121 Peer production facilitates collaboration among 
“radically diverse” groups.122 According to Yochai Benkler’s social 
production theory, our networked information environment has 
produced a popular culture that encourages active participation 
  
 116 Cass R. Sunstein, Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge ix–x (Oxford 
2006) (noting the author’s experience with public participation via blogs); Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security Disability Claims 140 (Yale 
1983) (explaining the ways in which participation and control could contribute to claim-
ants’ sense of fairness); Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for 
a New Age 258–59 (Cal 1984) (explaining the problem of uncertainty in politics and noting 
that strong democratic politics encourages public participation); Cass R. Sunstein, Fac-
tions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 Va L Rev 271, 272, 282 
(1986) (explaining the possible risks of factional tyranny and self-interested representa-
tion to the administrative process, particularly in light of the insulation of administrators 
from electoral control); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatiza-
tion, 116 Harv L Rev 1285 (2003) (arguing that privatization may provide a way for tradi-
tionally public goals to be reached); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: 
Accounting for the New Religion, 116 Harv L Rev 1229, 1243 (2003) (arguing that favoring 
privatization increases competition, which creates pressure to generate information that 
may aid in administrative decisionmaking). 
 117 Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv L 
Rev 1669, 1709 (1975).  
 118 Rossi, 92 Nw U L Rev at 211 (cited in note 17). 
 119 See Russell J. Dalton, The Good Citizen: How a Younger Generation is Reshaping 
Politics 170 (CQ 2008) (explaining that younger Americans, such as members of Genera-
tion X and the Millennials, seem likely to seize upon new, networked opportunities for 
public participation). Political science research reveals that newer generations tend to 
connect with government through online public interest groups and internet discussion 
forums. Id at 75. This proposal would tap into these peer-to-peer networks and enhance 
the legitimacy of the administrative state. 
 120 See Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet—And How to Stop It 92 (Yale 
2008) (explaining that the generative Internet and PC make political and artistic expres-
sion easier).  
 121 Benkler, 52 Duke L J at 1256 (cited in note 108). 
 122 Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Mar-
kets and Freedom 232 (Yale 2006). See Brett M. Frischmann, Cultural Environment and 
The Wealth of Networks, 74 U Chi L Rev 1083 (2007), for a thoughtful review of Yochai 
Benkler’s The Wealth of Networks. 
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in matters of public policy.123 Such “commons-based” participa-
tion arguably deepens the legitimacy of government action.124 
Consider the online communities that exposed an e-voting 
system’s flaws in 2003. Early that year, activist Bev Harris found 
Diebold’s source code on the company’s website.125 Harris posted 
the source code on her website, urging viewers to examine and 
distribute it to file-sharing networks.126 Internet discussion fo-
rums avidly discussed the source code’s technical imperfec-
tions.127 Computer scientists from Johns Hopkins and Rice Uni-
versity reviewed the source code, posting their criticism on the 
internet.128 
A few months later, a hacker sent Harris a cache of internal 
Diebold emails that demonstrated the company knew that cer-
tain of its e-voting systems had problems.129 After Harris posted 
the emails on her website, college students widely distributed 
them to peer-to-peer networks to keep the issue before the pub-
lic.130 In late 2003, California’s Voting Systems Panel (“Panel”) 
launched an investigation into Diebold’s e-voting machines.131 
The Panel subsequently removed certain of the company’s e-
voting machines from the state’s voting precincts.132 
As the Diebold example suggests, revealing the source codes 
to the public would allow individuals and groups to study the 
accuracy and security of these systems.133 For example, online 
  
 123 Benkler, The Wealth of Networks at 232 (cited in note 122). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Rubin, Brave New Ballot at 32 (cited in note 10). 
 126 Benkler, The Wealth of Networks at 232 (cited in note 122). 
 127 Harris, Black Box Voting at 104, 140–47 (cited in note 30). 
 128 Benkler, The Wealth of Networks at 227 (cited in note122). See Rubin, Brave New 
Ballot (cited in note 10) (describing his role in exposing weaknesses in Diebold source 
that Bev Harris discovered). Computer scientists found that a hacker could program a 
voter card to let it cast as many votes as the hacker liked. Thompson, Voting Machines, 
NY Times Magazine (cited in note 45). 
 129 Benkler, The Wealth of Networks at 227 (cited in note 122). 
 130 Id at 230. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id at 231. 
 133 Berry and Moss, 11 Info Polity at 21 (cited in note 104); Andrew Chadwick, Bring-
ing E-Democracy Back in: Why It Matters for Future Research on E-Governance, 21 Soc 
Sci Computer Rev 443, 452 (2003); Wagner Testimony at 4 (cited in note 28); Douglas W. 
Jones, Voting System Transparency and Security: The Need for Standard Models, Testi-
mony before the Election Assistance Commission Technical Guidelines Development 
Committee, National Institute of Standards and Technology (Sept 20, 2004), available at 
<http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/nist2004.shtml> (last visited Feb 24, 2008); Jo-
seph Lorenzo Hall, Transparency and Access to Source Code in E-Voting (Berkeley Work-
ing Paper, 2006), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=909582> (last visited Feb 24, 
2008). 
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communities could evaluate a system’s design for hidden bi-
ases.134 Programmers recruited by public interest groups could 
check the policies embedded in automated decision-making sys-
tems like CBMS. They could provide feedback on the privacy and 
security risks posed by proposed systems.135 
This feedback would exert pressure on agencies to fix prob-
lems at the margins that they might be inclined to ignore. Such 
participation could enhance the public’s perception of these sys-
tems.136 Indeed, the Netherlands has focused its e-Government 
initiative on the adoption of open source software for the accu-
racy and legitimacy it brings.137 
The public’s participation could potentially combat interest-
group capture of agencies and cronyism.138 Open code could illu-
minate agency decisions that advance the interests of powerful 
groups.139 For instance, if California’s Department of Elections 
insists that vendors disclose their source codes during the bid-
ding process, the technical community would have the opportu-
nity to expose flaws in e-voting systems before election boards 
sign procurement contracts.140 Such feedback might inhibit an 
  
 134 Lessig, Code Version 2.0 at 102 (cited in note 68) (arguing that members of the 
technical community now have power to restructure norms); Nissenbaum, How Computer 
Systems Embody Values, Computer at 119 (cited in note 69) (noting that engineers now 
face the challenge of building systems with certain moral properties). 
 135 See Bamberger and Mulligan, 75 U Chi L Rev at 89 (cited in note 100) (explaining 
that because the PIA and other public documentation of e-Passport program did not pro-
vide the exact specifications of the system under consideration, the public could not re-
view and test the proposed system). Professors Bamberger and Mulligan explain that the 
E-Government Act lacks explicit mechanisms for public participation in the PIA process, 
thus limiting opportunities for outside experts to assist the agency in identifying the 
privacy implications of complex data storage systems. Id. at 87. Although no formal proc-
ess for public participation is provided under the E-Government Act, this proposal would 
enable outside groups and technicians to provide agencies with informal feedback on the 
security features and privacy problems posed by proposed systems. 
 136 Berry and Moss, 11 Info Polity at 27 (cited in note 104). But see A. Michael Froom-
kin, Technologies for Democracy, in Peter M. Shane, ed, Democracy Online: The Prospects 
for Political Renewal Through the Internet 15 (Routledge 2004) (describing initiatives in 
England and Scotland that allow citizens to propose legislation via government website). 
 137 OSOSS Webpage, available at <http://www.ososs.nl/about_ososs> (last visited Feb 
24, 2008). 
 138 The central concern here is that well-organized groups exercise disproportionate 
influence over agency policymaking. Stewart, 88 Harv L Rev at 1684–1687 (cited in note 
117). Scholars have argued that administrative law ought to promote deliberative ration-
ality and to constrain the influence of special interest groups. Sunstein, 72 Va L Rev at 
271–96 (cited in note 116). 
 139 Public choice theory contends that administrative regulation is little more than 
private contracts that benefit interest groups at the public expense. Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law 23–29 (Yale 
1997). 
 140 See text accompanying notes 104–05 discussing San Francisco Elections Commis-
 
 4/29/2008 5:04:26 PM 
355] OPEN CODE GOVERNANCE 377 
agency’s inclination to pick vendors based on political connec-
tions.141 Open code thus has the potential to address concerns 
that special interests might dominate the procurement proc-
ess.142 
The drafters of the Administrative Procedure Act aimed to 
establish a system in which “citizens and representatives, oper-
ating through responsive but expert organs, would make delib-
erative decisions.”143 Scholars lament that these democratic aspi-
rations have not been realized.144 Public participation has with-
ered in part due to the complexity of regulatory issues, the power 
of interest groups, and the expense of participation.145 
Closed systems make this problem worse. Open code, how-
ever, could reverse this trend. It could also facilitate the partici-
pation of individuals who previously had little connection with 
the administrative state. As the next section discusses, informed 
citizens could pressure elected officials to ensure the accuracy 
  
sion’s recommendation that the state open up source code during procurement process. 
 141 I thank my colleague Rena Steinzor for this insight. Activists have similar con-
cerns about the impartiality of the companies that certify e-voting systems because ven-
dors pay for their services and because their certification reports are not public. Barr, 
Bishop, and Gondree, Fixing Federal E-Voting Standards, Commun of the Assoc for Com-
puting Machinery at 19 (cited in note 11). With few vendors selling e-voting machines, if 
one certification firm is too demanding, it would lose a huge share of its business if the 
vendor it criticized stops contracting with it. Indeed, it may be excluded from the industry 
if other vendors follow suit. Concerns about the impartiality of CIBER, which has certi-
fied most of this country’s e-voting machines, were recently raised to the Federal Elec-
tions Assistance Commission. Kim Zetter, New York to Grill Voting Machine Testing Lab, 
Wired (May 4, 2007), available at <http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/05/new_york_ 
to_gri.html> (last visited Feb 24, 2008). CIBER lost its accreditation to certify voting 
machines in January 2007 due to its lax oversight of vendors’ e-voting systems. Christo-
pher Drew, Citing Problems, U.S. Bars Lab from Testing Electronic Voting, NY Times A1 
(Jan 4, 2007). CIBER had been criticized for missing security and reliability problems 
long before its suspension. Id. See also Douglas W. Jones, Misassessment of Security in 
Computer-Based Election Systems, Cryptobytes at 9 (Fall 2004). 
 142 Samir Chopra and Scott Dexter argue that the opacity of e-voting systems’ design 
is a “secret compact between governments and manufacturers . . ., who alone are privy to 
the details of the voting process.” Samir Chopra and Scott D. Dexter, Decoding Libera-
tion: The Promise of Free and Open Source Software 169 (Routledge 2007). 
 143 Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice 322–326 (Oxford 1997). Nelson 
Rosenbaum explains that a major concern of the drafters of the Administrative Procedure 
Act of 1946 was the “perception that the interests of most citizens were being disregarded 
by a group of decision-making institutions that increasingly affected important aspects of 
their lives.” Nelson M. Rosenbaum, Citizen Participation and Democratic Theory, in Stu-
art Langton, ed, Citizen Participation in America: Essays on the State of the Art 43, 45 
(Lexington 1978). The statutory mandates authorizing citizen participation recognized 
the need to empower citizens to insure administrative fairness and accountability. Id. 
 144 Sunstein, Free Markets at 322 (cited in note 143). 
 145 Id. See also Rosenbaum, Citizen Participation at 48 (cited in note 143) (“Citizen 
participation can be extremely costly, unwieldy, and time-consuming.”). 
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and security of critical automated systems, amplifying their offi-
cials’ political accountability. 
C. Political Accountability Facilitated 
This proposal should also appeal to supporters of a strong 
executive model of administrative law. This model views presi-
dential and gubernatorial influence over agency action as en-
hancing the administrative state’s accountability by creating an 
“electoral link between the public and the bureaucracy.”146 Presi-
dents and governors concern themselves with an agency’s effec-
tiveness because the public holds chief executive officers respon-
sible for governmental performance.147 Thus, executive officers 
and their senior staff work to ensure that agencies achieve their 
“objectives, without undue cost, in an expeditious and coherent 
manner” to ensure reelection.148 The model contends that presi-
dential administrations would be more likely to consider the 
preferences of the general public, rather than just parochial in-
terests.149 
This Article’s proposal closes the information gap between a 
system’s designers and the public, allowing the public to formu-
late more focused, informed complaints about a troubled system 
and to present those complaints to chief executive officers.150 
Senior executive staff could then respond to the public’s specific 
concerns. The specificity of the public’s complaints would make it 
harder for agencies to ignore them. At the same time, an open 
code approach would make it easier to hold an agency account-
able for its response to such complaints. 
  
 146 Sunstein, Free Markets at 322 (cited in note 143). 
 147 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv L Rev 2245, 2335 (2001); 
Cynthia R. Farina, The “Chief Executive” and the Quiet Constitutional Revolution, 49 
Admin L Rev 179, 180-84 (1997) (addressing the impact of chief executives on “regulatory 
enterprise”). 
 148 Id. Advocates of this view argue it is equally applicable to executives whose desire 
for reelection is strong and to those who cannot serve again given their interest in their 
historical legacy. This view notes that the accountability point should not be overstated. 
The resolution of any particular regulatory issue plays a small role in the public’s percep-
tion of presidential performance. See id. 
 149 Sunstein, Free Markets at 325 (cited in note 143); D. Stephen Cupps, Emerging 
Problems of Citizen Participation, 37 Pub Admin Rev 478 (1977). 
 150 This proposal would facilitate the transparency necessary for the operation of this 
model. Unlike software whose accuracy is unmistakably clear from its operation, such as 
life-critical systems like aircraft software, problems in closed code often remain hidden. In 
many instances, it may not be clear to the public that a problem even exists that needs 
correction. 
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Colorado’s experience with CBMS demonstrates the point. In 
response to both a lawsuit filed by public interest groups about 
the failure of CBMS, and media coverage of the issue, Colorado’s 
Governor created a new agency position charged with fixing 
CBMS.151 Similarly, in 2007, California’s Secretary of State 
launched an investigation of the state’s e-voting systems after 
public interest groups expressed concerns about voter disenfran-
chisement.152 
The next section explores how open code model would pro-
tect and amplify the expertise of agency decision-making. 
D. Expertise Advanced 
The technical community’s input would advance the exper-
tise model of administrative law, which emphasizes an agency’s 
role in bringing specialized knowledge into the political do-
main.153 An agency’s expertise allows it to communicate with 
substantive experts, identify better experts, and assess which 
insights can be turned into workable administrative practices.154 
Agencies have the capacity to bring together specialized person-
nel and data, facilitating comprehensive analysis that generalist 
legislatures cannot match.155 This model depends upon agencies 
having the necessary expertise and information available to it.156 
The input of interested programmers could advance agency 
expertise in two critical ways. First, programmers could ensure 
that programming mistakes do not defeat an agency’s own exper-
tise. For instance, technicians working with public interest firms 
  
 151 Bill Scanlon, Benefits System Director Named, Denver Rocky Mtn News 28A (May 
28, 2005). 
 152 See text accompanying notes 83–91. 
 153 See Stephen G. Breyer, et al, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy: Problems, 
Text, and Cases 182–85 (Aspen 6th ed 2006); Landis, The Administrative Process at 23–28 
(cited in note 18) (explaining that expertise is a critical characteristic of agencies and the 
pressing need that engendered them). 
 154 Stephen G. Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation 
59–63 (Harvard 1993) (advocating a focus on expertise in administrative decisionmaking). 
Bruce Ackerman is another prominent advocate of focusing on expertise in administrative 
law. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 Harv L Rev 633, 697–715 
(2000). 
 155 See Mashaw, Due Process at 19 (cited in note 2) (explaining that the creation of 
prominent administrative agencies emerged as a result of the need for more specialized 
expertise); Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle at 73–74 (cited in note 154). 
 156 Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice at 50 (cited in note 116) (explaining that the ideal of 
instrumental rationality in the context of particular administrative programs depends on 
a variety of conditions including whether administrators have all of the facts that are 
relevant to decisionmaking). 
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could catch programming errors that alter established policy in 
systems such as CBMS.157 That feedback would allow an agency 
to insist that its vendor fix the code to reflect the agency’s own 
policy choices. 
Second, the technical community would provide agencies 
with crucial data to make optimal decisions. The expertise model 
extols agencies for their “capacity to bring together information 
on the beneficial and detrimental aspects of regulatory alterna-
tives.”158 Closed systems prevent agencies from fulfilling that 
role. Open code would allow agencies to leverage the expertise of 
a broad technical community in making procurement decisions 
and in reviewing systems.159 This proposal would provide an in-
expensive means to enhance the expertise of agency decision-
making. 
Such expert input is particularly important for agencies that 
do not have access to such expertise either in-house or through 
outside advisors.160 For instance, election officials currently lack 
sufficient information to conduct rigorous reviews of e-voting sys-
tems.161 Election officials do not know enough about how the ma-
chines operate to assess them.162 As the elections supervisor of 
Florida’s Leon County explained: vendors control all of the in-
formation about their e-voting machines and will not “tell me 
that [ ] buggy software is why I can’t get the right time on [the 
machines’] audit logs.”163 If the systems’ vendors made the source 
codes public, computer scientists and academics could help local 
and state election officials in checking these systems.164 In other 
cases, the technical community could assess data storage sys-
  
 157 See Citron, 85 Wash U L Rev (cited in note 8). 
 158 McGarity, Reinventing Rationality at 114 (cited in note 4). 
 159 See, for example, Joana Matos Penha-Lopes, Why Use an Open Source E-Voting 
System?, 37 Assoc for Computing Machinery Special Interest Group on Computer Sci Ed 
Bulletin 412 (Sept 2005); Bruce Schneier, What’s Wrong with Electronic Voting Ma-
chines?, openDemocracy (Nov 9, 2004), available at <http://www.opendemocracy.net/ 
media-voting/article_2213.jsp> (last visited Feb 24, 2008); Raba Technologies, Trusted 
Agent Report: Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting System (2004), available at <http://www. 
raba.com/press/TA_Report_AccuVote.pdf> (last visited Feb 24, 2008). 
 160 But See Bamberger and Mulligan, 75 U Chi L Rev at 100 (cited in note 100) (at-
tributing success of Chief Privacy Officer of Department of Homeland Security Nuala 
O’Connor Kelly to, in part, her ability to build a staff with varied privacy training and 
expertise who actively participated in privacy associations and conferences). 
 161 Rubin, Brave New Ballot at 24 (cited in note 10). 
 162 Thompson, Voting Machines, NY Times Magazine (cited in note 45). 
 163 Id. 
 164 Wagner Testimony at 4 (cited in note 28). 
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tems for security vulnerabilities.165 Programmers could inspect 
systems to ensure that they comply with privacy laws.166 In 
short, the technical community’s feedback would promote an 
agency’s expertness.167 
III. OBJECTIONS TO AN OPEN CODE MODEL 
This proposal, of course, is not free from serious objections. 
This Part evaluates three central concerns about an open code 
model and concludes that this proposal deserves adoption. First, 
this proposal may face implementation and cost constraints. 
Agencies may be unable to insist that their vendors reveal the 
source code under current contract terms. In that case, the cost 
of switching systems would be a serious concern. A new system 
may require investments in equipment and staff training.168 For 
instance, the Census Bureau recently dedicated significant re-
sources implementing CPS that it would not want to repeat.169 
Vendors also may raise their systems’ cost if forced to reveal 
their source codes. 
A switch, however, has the potential to reduce long-term 
costs, especially for troubled systems, such as e-voting machines 
and automated public benefits systems, which require substan-
tial resources to fix. Over the past three years, Colorado has 
spent millions of dollars working on CBMS, which continues to 
be plagued by problems.170 Texas’s adoption of a flawed auto-
  
 165 Of course not all security leaks relate to a system’s flaws. Some are attributed to 
human error like the Veterans Administration employee who took home a laptop contain-
ing millions of SSNs of veterans and the laptop was stolen. See David Stout, Veterans 
Agency to Atone with Free Credit Monitoring, NY Times A22 (June 22, 2006). 
 166 Berry and Moss, 11 Info Polity at 30 (cited in note 104) (noting alternatives to 
available products that store user information in a more covert manner). See generally 
Solove, The Digital Person at 68–71 (cited in note 42). 
 167 Christopher F. Edley, Jr., Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Control of 
Bureaucracy 22 (Yale 1990) (arguing that outside participation increases agency expertise 
by giving people affected by administrative rules the opportunity to be heard and by 
negating the tendency of agencies to exercise power in an arbitrary way). 
 168 Lee, 9 Vand J Enter & Tech L at 73 (cited in note 112) (explaining that the costs of 
switching to a new system may be too high for governments to have an incentive to adopt 
an open code system). 
 169 Horvath Email (cited in note 33) (explaining that “[h]aving just undergone the 
lengthy and difficult behind-the-scenes conversion to Blaise, we are unlikely to [move 
towards open source software and] repeat that process in the foreseeable future”). 
 170 Jerd Smith, Audit: Costly Errors in Computer System for Benefits Had High Mis-
take Rate, Denver Rocky Mtn News 4A (Apr 19, 2006) (explaining that errors in comput-
ing system may cost Colorado as much as $10 million); Bill Scanlon, Millions Spent on 
Welfare Fix, Denver Rocky Mtn News 6A (Sept 3, 2005) (explaining that CBMS is “clumsy 
to use, has great trouble generating reports, requires users to work around kinks and 
makes mistakes issuing benefits”); Scanlon, Benefits System Director Named at 28A (cited 
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mated public benefits system similarly wasted hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars, eventually requiring the state to replace its ini-
tial vendor with another firm.171 Open code would allow agencies 
and their vendors to enjoy feedback about a system’s accuracy 
and security from programmers whose services are virtually free. 
Significantly, the benefits of a more transparent and legiti-
mate system should not be undervalued. Open code would pro-
vide opportunities for public participation, political accountabil-
ity, and expertise that are now absent. It might prevent the dis-
enfranchisement of voters and ensure greater accuracy in deci-
sion-making systems. Agencies and legislatures should consider 
the short-term costs of a new system with the long-term savings 
of a more accurate, secure, and legitimate open system. 
Critics may argue that vendors will refuse to build open sys-
tems that reveal their trade secrets. They may suggest that ven-
dors will wait to see who moves first so they can free-ride on an-
other’s investments in research and development, resulting in 
stasis.172 A first-mover problem, however, may be illusory for two 
reasons. 
First, the high price tag of procurement contracts strongly 
suggests that vendors will design these systems. Because the 
government is the sole buyer in these markets, vendors will meet 
its conditions rather than dropping out of the market altogether. 
Indeed, in January 2008, Diebold spokesman Chris Riggall noted 
that “the company is considering making the software open 
source on its next generation of touch-screen machines” due to 
growing pressure from states.173 As Riggall explains: “if the ex-
pectations of our customers change, we’ll have to respond to that 
reality.”174 
Second, vendors already have embraced the open code model 
given its potential for lucrative contracts. For instance, Open 
Voting Solutions, an e-voting machine vendor whose source code 
would be publicly available, has submitted proposals to boards of 
elections in New York.175 
  
in note 151) (noting decision to create a position to correct the problems with CBMS). 
 171 Patrick Michels, The Tale of TIERS: Lessons from the Epic Pursuit of the Perfect 
Records Management System 29 Government Tech (eRepublic Sept 2007). 
 172 Cindy Cohn of the Electronic Frontier Foundation raised this issue at the “Law in 
a Networked World” symposium. 
 173 Thompson, Voting Machines, NY Times Magazine (cited in note 45). 
 174 Id. 
 175 See Open Voting Consortium Website Press Release, Vendor Applies for Open 
Voting Consortium Certification (Oct 15, 2006), available at <http://www. 
openvotingconsortium.org/node/82> (last visited Feb 24, 2008). 
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If a first-mover disadvantage does arise, then states could 
band together in a consortium to purchase systems, splitting the 
costs of research and development. A first-move disadvantage 
supports the OMB’s involvement in this issue. The OMB could 
help coordinate purchasing or have federal agencies purchase en 
masse for all of the states that participate in programs that they 
run.176 Between the software the OMB buys directly and that it 
funds, it dominates the market. Given the important public pol-
icy concerns at stake, the government has every right to use its 
market power to ensure that products meeting its specifications 
are available. 
The second objection involves skepticism about whether this 
Article’s proposal would generate the benefits that it promises. 
Some may question whether a broader technical audience would, 
in fact, review the source code of certain systems.177 The typical 
open source project only has a small number of contributors.178 
That surely would not be true of high-profile systems, such as e-
voting machines. As Professor Wagner has explained, and as 
past practice makes clear, open code e-voting systems would at-
tract “the country’s best independent technical experts to analyze 
the source code and publish their findings.”179 Such projects gen-
erate interest due to the reputational advantages of participating 
in such projects.180 
Consider Australia’s open code e-voting project. A private 
company designed Australia’s e-voting system and posted all of 
the drafts of its source code online for review and criticism.181 
Interested programmers and independent auditors studied the 
source code and provided feedback.182 An Australian National 
University professor caught the most serious problem.183 The 
vendor, in turn, fixed the source code, shoring up the system’s 
  
 176 It is naturally true that states need a great deal of customization for systems de-
pending upon how they administer a program and what policies they have selected for 
those programs. 
 177 Jason Kitcat, Source Availability and E-Voting: An Advocate Recants, Commun of 
the Assoc for Computing Machinery 65, 66 (Oct 2004) (arguing that the more likely sce-
nario is that the majority of open code would be ignored by the broader audience). Paul 
Ohm raised this concern at the “Law in a Networked World” symposium. 
 178 Kitcat, Source Availability at 66 (cited in note 177). 
 179 Wagner Testimony at 4 (cited in note 28). 
 180 Sunstein, Infotopia at 148 (cited in note 116). 
 181 Moynihan, 64 Pub Admin Rev at 524 (cited in note 45). 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 4/29/2008 5:04:26 PM 
384 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2008: 
security.184 Australia’s e-voting system has received broad praise 
for its reliability and security.185 Similarly, computer scientists 
working for the Open Voting Consortium have begun program-
ming open source software for election systems in the United 
States.186 
Systems affecting interest groups also would receive atten-
tion. One might imagine that public interest groups would direct 
significant energies to ensuring the accuracy of automated deci-
sion systems such as CBMS. Programmers might also review the 
source code for public benefits systems due to a sense that they 
are part of a meaningful social project.187 
Although the chances of review are reduced for low-profile 
systems, the possibility is never completely absent or predictable. 
Indeed, computer security academics might ask students to as-
sess such systems. Even if the source code of systems is not actu-
ally studied, important benefits remain. Those who believe that 
their work will be reviewed are more careful.188 Due to the repu-
tational costs of sloppy work, source code disclosure gives ven-
dors a powerful incentive to ensure that their code is free of prob-
lems.189 Thus, the open code model may inspire vendors to more 
thoroughly check the code’s accuracy and security even for ob-
scure programs. 
The third objection concerns the security of open code sys-
tems. Software manufacturers argue that open code would en-
hance a system’s vulnerability.190 The computer security litera-
ture, however, rejects the notion that secrecy ensures a system’s 
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safety.191 This literature explains that security is not achieved by 
concealing security defects, but instead by allowing interested 
programmers to identify flaws that need to be fixed.192 Open code 
enlarges the available pool of intelligence, enabling a community 
of testers to identify bugs and problems with the code.193 Be-
cause it is more likely that flaws will be discovered if the source 
code is available for inspection, computer scientists advocate 
open e-voting systems.194 The only security measures that must 
remain secret are a system’s changeable secrets, such as its 
passwords and cryptographic keys.195 
  
At the same time, revealing the source code incurs only a 
low-level of risk.196 Unlike a warring nation that learns much 
from discovering an enemy’s military plans, computer attackers 
learn little from the disclosure of a system’s source code.197 This 
is because computer security measures, such as firewalls, have a 
low level of uniqueness.198 As a result, attackers can find a sys-
tem’s flaws without the source code.199 
Studies demonstrate that open source software provides bet-
ter security than proprietary software.200 For this reason, agen-
cies with salient security requirements, such as the Department 
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of Defense and the National Security Agency, have adopted 
Linux operating systems.201 The Departments of Veterans Af-
fairs, Defense, and Health and Human Services employ open 
source software to maintain patient health records.202 Califor-
nia’s Air Resource Board runs 65 percent of its databases on 
open source software for the security that it offers.203 
This proposal, however, has its limits. It should not apply 
when the importance of secrecy outweighs the transparency, de-
mocratic legitimacy, and expertise open code brings. The excep-
tions to the Freedom of Information Act’s (“FOIA”) disclosure 
requirements provide insight into situations where public policy 
concerns might support a closed code regime.204 
Consider these examples. FOIA excludes information com-
piled by law enforcement from public disclosure if producing such 
information would reveal “techniques and procedures for law en-
forcement investigations.”205 The IRS’s auditing software might 
qualify as code that should remain closed in order to prevent in-
dividuals from gaming the system. The “No Fly” data matching 
program seemingly falls within FOIA’s exemption from disclo-
sure information that would “endanger the life or physical safety 
of any individual.”206 Its source code should not be opened on the 
grounds that terrorists could evade detection if they knew the 
system’s logic.207   
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To that end, this Article’s proposal should provide a pre-
sumption of open code that could be rebutted by other important 
public policy concerns. Evidence of such public policy concerns, 
however, should be carefully reviewed. The administrative law 
values that an open code regime secures should not be forsaken 
without clear justification. 
CONCLUSION 
Critics of the administrative state are troubled by its opacity 
and lack of democratic pedigree. Agencies’ closed information 
systems exacerbate these concerns. This Article argues that 
opening up the source code of these systems can combat these 
problems by illuminating agency decisions bound up in these sys-
tems. An open code model would secure the participation of a 
technical community that has previously played no role in the 
administrative state. And more importantly, this proposal would 
enhance the political accountability and expertise of agency deci-
sion-making. 
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ensure due process protections). 
